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Abstract
We study how to communicate findings of Bayesian inference to third parties,
while preserving the strong guarantee of differential privacy. Our main contribu-
tions are four different algorithms for private Bayesian inference on probabilistic
graphical models. These include two mechanisms for adding noise to the Bayesian
updates, either directly to the posterior parameters, or to their Fourier transform so
as to preserve update consistency. We also utilise a recently introduced posterior
sampling mechanism, for which we prove bounds for the specific but general case
of discrete Bayesian networks; and we introduce a maximum-a-posteriori private
mechanism. Our analysis includes utility and privacy bounds, with a novel focus
on the influence of graph structure on privacy. Worked examples and experiments
with Bayesian naïve Bayes and Bayesian linear regression illustrate the application
of our mechanisms.
1 Introduction
We consider the problem faced by a statistician B who analyses data and communi-
cates her findings to a third partyA . WhileB wants to learn as much as possible from
the data, she doesn’t want A to learn about any individual datum. This is for example
the case where A is an insurance agency, the data are medical records, and B wants
to convey the efficacy of drugs to the agency, without revealing the specific illnesses of
individuals in the population. Such requirements of privacy are of growing interest in
the learning Chaudhuri and Hsu (2012); Duchi, Jordan, and Wainwright (2013), theo-
retical computer science Dwork and Smith (2009); McSherry and Talwar (2007) and
databases communities Barak et al. (2007); Zhang et al. (2014) due to the impact on
individual privacy by real-world data analytics.
In our setting, we assume that B is using Bayesian inference to draw conclusions
from observations of a system of random variables by updating a prior distribution
on parameters (i.e., latent variables) to a posterior. Our goal is to release an approxi-
mation to the posterior that preserves privacy. We adopt the formalism of differential
privacy to characterise how easy it is for A to discover facts about the individual data
from the aggregate posterior. Releasing the posterior permits external parties to make
further inferences at will. For example, a third-party pharmaceutical might use the re-
leased posterior as a prior on the efficacy of drugs, and update it with their own patient
data. Or they could form a predictive posterior for classification or regression, all while
preserving differential privacy of the original data.
Our focus in this paper is Bayesian inference in probabilistic graphical models
(PGMs), which are popular as a tool for modelling conditional independence assump-
tions. Similar to the effect on statistical and computational efficiency of non-private
inference, a central tenet of this paper is that independence structure should impact
privacy. Our mechanisms and theoretical bounds are the first to establish such a link
between PGM graph structure and privacy.
Main Contributions. We develop the first mechanisms for Bayesian inference on the
flexible PGM framework (cf. Table 1). We propose two posterior perturbation mecha-
nisms for networks with likelihood functions from exponential families and conjugate
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priors, that add Laplace noise Dwork et al. (2006) to posterior parameters (or their
Fourier coefficients) to preserve privacy. The latter achieves stealth through consistent
posterior updates. For general Bayesian networks, posteriors may be non-parametric.
In this case, we explore a mechanism Dimitrakakis et al. (2014) which samples from
the posterior to answer queries—no additional noise is injected. We complement our
study with a maximum a posteriori estimator that leverages the exponential mecha-
nism McSherry and Talwar (2007). Our utility and privacy bounds connect privacy and
graph/dependency structure, and are complemented by illustrative experiments with
Bayesian naïve Bayes and linear regression.
Related Work. Many individual learning algorithms have been adapted to main-
tain differential privacy, including regularised logistic regression Chaudhuri and Mon-
teleoni (2008), the SVM Rubinstein et al. (2012); Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and Sarwate
(2011), PCA Chaudhuri, Sarwate, and Sinha (2012), the functional mechanism Zhang
et al. (2012) and trees Jagannathan, Pillaipakkamnatt, and Wright (2009).
Probabilistic graphical models have been used to preserve privacy. Zhang et al.
(2014) learned a graphical model from data, in order to generate surrogate data for
release; while Williams and McSherry (2010) fit a model to the response of private
mechanisms to clean up output and improve accuracy. Xiao and Xiong (2012) similarly
used Bayesian credible intervals to increase the utility of query responses.
Little attention has been paid to private inference in the Bayesian setting. We seek
to adapt Bayesian inference to preserve differential privacy when releasing posteri-
ors. Dimitrakakis et al. (2014; 2015) introduce a differentially-private mechanism for
Bayesian inference based on posterior sampling—a mechanism on which we build—
while Zheng (2015) considers further refinements. Wang, Fienberg, and Smola (2015)
explore Monte Carlo approaches to Bayesian inference using the same mechanism,
while Mir (2012) was the first to establish differential privacy of the Gibbs estima-
tor McSherry and Talwar (2007) by minimising risk bounds.
This paper is the first to develop mechanisms for differential privacy under the gen-
eral framework of Bayesian inference on multiple, dependent r.v.’s. Our mechanisms
consider graph structure and include a purely Bayesian approach that only places con-
ditions on the prior. We show how the (stochastic) Lipschitz assumptions of Dimi-
trakakis et al. (2014) lift to graphs of r.v.’s, and bound KL-divergence when releasing
an empirical posterior based on a modified prior. While Chaudhuri, Monteleoni, and
Sarwate (2011) achieve privacy in regularised Empirical Risk Minimisation through
objective randomisation, we do so through conditions on priors. We develop an alter-
nate approach that uses the additive-noise mechanism of Dwork et al. (2006) to perturb
posterior parameterisations; and we apply techniques due to Barak et al. (2007), who
released marginal tables that maintain consistency in addition to privacy, by adding
Laplace noise in the Fourier domain. Our motivation is novel: we wish to guarantee
privacy against omniscient attackers and stealth against unsuspecting third parties.
2
DBN only Privacy Utility type Utility bound
Laplace 3 (, 0) closeness of posterior O (mn lnn)
[
1− exp
(
− n2|I|
)]
+
√−O (mn lnn) ln δ
Fourier 3 (, 0) close posterior params 4|NI |
(
2|pii| log |NI |δ + t|NI |
)
Sampler 7 (2L, 0) if Lipschitz; or
(0,
√
M/2) stochastic Lipschitz
expected utility functional
wrt posterior
O
(
η +
√
ln(1/δ)/N
)
Dimitrakakis et al. (2015)
MAP 7 (, 0) closeness of MAP P(Sc2t) ≤ exp(−t)/ξ (St)
Table 1: Summary of the privacy/utility guarantees for this paper’s mechanisms. See
below for parameter definitions.
2 Problem Setting
Consider a Bayesian statistician B estimating the parameters θ of some family of
distributions FΘ = { pθ : θ ∈ Θ } on a system of r.v.’s X = {Xi : i ∈ I }, where
I is an index set, with observations denoted xi ∈ Xi, where Xi is the sample space of
Xi.B has a prior distribution1 ξ on Θ reflecting her prior belief, which she updates on
an observation x to obtain posterior
ξ(B | x) =
∫
B
pθ (x) dξ (θ)
φ(x)
, ∀B ∈ SΘ
where φ(x) ,
∫
Θ
pθ (x) dξ (θ). Posterior updates are iterated over an i.i.d. dataset
D ∈ D = (∏i Xi)n to ξ(· | D).
B’s goal is to communicate her posterior distribution to a third party A , while
limiting the information revealed about the original data. From the point of view of the
data provider, B is a trusted party.2 However, she may still inadvertently reveal infor-
mation. We assume that A is computationally unbounded, and has knowledge of the
prior ξ and the family FΘ. To guarantee that A can gain little additional information
about D from their communication,B uses Bayesian inference to learn from the data,
and a differentially-private posterior to ensure disclosure to A is carefully controlled.
2.1 Probabilistic Graphical Models
Our main results focus on PGMs which model conditional independence assumptions
with joint factorisation
pθ(x) =
∏
i∈I
pθ (xi | xpii) , xpii = {xj : j ∈ pii } ,
where pii are the parents of the i-th variable in a Bayesian network—a directed acyclic
graph with r.v.’s as nodes.
Example 1. For concreteness, we illustrate some of our mechanisms on systems of
Bernoulli r.v.’s Xi ∈ {0, 1}. In that case, we represent the conditional distribution of
Xi given its parents as Bernoulli with parameters θi,j ∈ [0, 1] :
(Xi | Xpii = j) ∼ Bernoulli(θi,j) .
1Precisely, a probability measure on a σ-algebra (Θi,SΘi ).
2Cryptographic tools for untrusted B do not prevent information leakage to A cf. e.g., Pagnin et al.
(2014).
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The choice of conjugate prior ξ(θ) =
∏
i,j ξi,j(θi,j) has Beta marginals with parame-
ters αi,j , βi,j , so that:
(θi,j | αi,j = α, βi,j = β) ∼ Beta(α, β) .
Given observation x, the updated posterior Beta parameters are αi,j := αi,j + xi and
βi,j := βi,j + (1− xi) if xpii = j.
2.2 Differential Privacy
B communicates to A by releasing information about the posterior distribution, via
randomised mechanism M that maps dataset D ∈ D to a response in set Y . Dwork et
al. (2006) characterise when such a mechanism is private:
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy). A randomised mechanismM : D → Y is (, δ)-DP
if for any neighbouring D, D˜ ∈ D, and measurable B ⊆ Y:
P[M(D) ∈ B] ≤ eP[M(D˜) ∈ B] + δ,
where D = (xi)ni=1, D˜ = (x˜
i)ni=1 are neighbouring if x
i 6= x˜i for at most one i.
This definition requires that neighbouring datasets induce similar response distri-
butions. Consequently, it is impossible forA to identify the true dataset from bounded
mechanism query responses. Differential privacy assumes no bounds on adversarial
computation or auxiliary knowledge.
3 Privacy by Posterior Perturbation
One approach to differential privacy is to use additive Laplace noise (Dwork et al.,
2006). Previous work has focused on the addition of noise directly to the outputs of a
non-private mechanism. We are the first to apply Laplace noise to the posterior param-
eter updates.
3.1 Laplace Mechanism on Posterior Updates
Under the setting of Example 1, we can add Laplace noise to the posterior parameters.
Algorithm 1 releases perturbed parameter updates for the Beta posteriors, calculated
simply by counting. It then adds zero-mean Laplace-distributed noise to the updates
∆ω = (· · · ,∆αi,j ,∆βi,j , · · · ). This is the final dependence on D. Finally, the per-
turbed updates ∆ω′ are truncated at zero to rule out invalid Beta parameters and are
upper truncated at n. This yields an upper bound on the raw updates and facilitates an
application of McDiarmid’s bounded-differences inequality (cf. Lemma A.1 in the Ap-
pendix) in our utility analysis. Note that this truncation only improves utility (relative
to the utility pre-truncation), and does not affect privacy.
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Algorithm 1 Laplace Mechanism on Posterior Updates
1: Input data D; graph I, {pii | i ∈ I}; parameter  > 0
2: calculate posterior updates: ∆αi,j ,∆βi,j for all
i ∈ I, j ∈ {0, 1}|pii|
3: perturb updates: ∆α′i,j , ∆αi,j + Lap
(
2|I|

)
,
∆β′i,j , ∆βi,j + Lap
(
2|I|

)
.
4: truncate: Z(1)i,j , 1[0,n](∆α′i,j), Z
(2)
i,j , 1[0,n](∆β′i,j)
5: output Zi,j = (Z
(1)
i,j , Z
(2)
i,j )
Privacy. To establish differential privacy of our mechanism, we must calculate a Lip-
schitz condition for the vector ∆ω called global sensitivity Dwork et al. (2006).
Lemma 1. For any neighbouring datasets D, D˜, the corresponding updates ∆ω,∆ω˜
satisfy ‖∆ω −∆ω˜‖1 ≤ 2|I|.
Proof. By changing the observations of one datum, at most two counts associated with
each Xi can change by 1.
Corollary 1. Algorithm 1 preserves -differential privacy.
Proof. Based on Lemma 1, the intermediate ∆ω′ preserve -differential privacy Dwork
et al. (2006). Since truncation depends only on ∆ω′, theZ preserves the same privacy.
Utility on Updates. Before bounding the effect on the posterior of the Laplace mech-
anism, we demonstrate a utility bound on the posterior update counts.
Proposition 1. With probability at least 1 − δ, for δ ∈ (0, 1), the update counts com-
puted by Algorithm 1 are close to the non-private counts
‖∆ω −∆ω′‖∞ ≤
2|I|

ln
(
2m
δ
)
,
where m =
∑
i∈I 2
|pii|.
This bound states that w.h.p., none of the updates can be perturbed beyondO(|I|2/).
This implies the same bound on the deviation between ∆ω and the revealed truncated
Z.
Utility on Posterior. We derive our main utility bounds for Algorithm 1 in terms
of posteriors, proved in the Appendix. We abuse notation, and use ξ to refer to the
prior density; its meaning will be apparent from context. Given priors ξi,j(θi,j) =
Beta (αi,j , βi,j), the posteriors on n observations are
ξi,j(θi,j |D) = Beta(αi,j + ∆αi,j , βi,j + ∆βi,j) .
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The privacy-preserving posterior parametrised by the output of Algorithm 1 is
ξ′i,j(θi,j |D) = Beta
(
αi,j + Z
(1)
i,j , βi,j + Z
(2)
i,j
)
.
It is natural to measure utility by the KL-divergence between the joint product pos-
teriors ξ(θ|D) and ξ′(θ|D), which is the sum of the component-wise divergences, with
each having known closed form. In our analysis, the divergence is a random quantity,
expressible as the sum
∑m
i,j fi,j(Zi,j), where the randomness is due to the added noise.
We demonstrate this r.v. is not too big, w.h.p.
Theorem 1. Let m =
∑
i∈I 2
|pii|. Assume that Zi,j are independent and f is a map-
ping from Zm to R: f(· · · , zi,j , · · · ) ,
∑
i,j fi,j(zi,j). Given δ > 0, we have
P
f(Z) ≥ E(f(Z)) +
−1
2
∑
i,j
ci,j ln δ
 12
 ≤ δ
where ci,j ≤ (2n + 1) ln[(αi,j + n + 1) + (βi,j + n + 1)) and E(fi,j(Zi,j)] ≤
n ln((αi,j + ∆αi,j)(βi,j + ∆βi,j)) = U .
Moreover, when n ≥ b = 2|I| , the bound for expectation can be refined as the following
ln[(αi,j + n+ 1)(βi,j + n+ 1)]
(
n
2
exp
(
− n
2|I|
))
.
The loss of utility measured by KL-divergence is no more than
O (mn lnn)
[
1− exp
(
− n
2|I|
)]
+
√
−O (mn lnn) ln δ
with probability at least 1− δ.
Note thatm depends on the structure of the network: bounds are better for networks
with an underlying graph having smaller average in-degree.
3.2 Laplace Mechanism in the Fourier Domain
Algorithm 1 follows Kerckhoffs’s Principle Kerckhoffs (1883) of “no security through
obscurity”: differential privacy defends against a mechanism-aware attacker. However
additional stealth may be required in certain circumstances. An oblivious observer
will be tipped off to our privacy-preserving activities by our independent perturba-
tions, which are likely inconsistent with one-another (e.g., noisy counts forX1, X2 and
X2, X3 will say different things about X2). To achieve differential privacy and stealth,
we turn to Barak et al. (2007)’s study of consistent marginal contingency table release.
This section presents a particularly natural application to Bayesian posterior updates.
Denote by h ∈ R{0,1}|I| the contingency table over r.v.’s I induced by D: i.e., for
each combination of variables j ∈ {0, 1}|I|, component or cell hj is a non-negative
count of the observations in D with characteristic j. Geometrically h is a real-valued
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function over the |I|-dimensional Boolean hypercube. Then the parameter delta’s of
our first mechanism correspond to cells of (|pii|+ 1)-way marginal contingency tables
Cpii(h) where vector pii , pii+ei and the projection/marginalisation operator is defined
as (
Cj(h)
)
γ
,
∑
η:〈η,j〉=γ
hη . (1)
We wish to release these statistics as before, however we will not represent them under
their Euclidean coordinates but instead in the Fourier basis {f j : j ∈ {0, 1}|I|} where
f jγ , (−1)〈γ,j〉2−|I|/2 .
Due to this basis structure and linearity of the projection operator, any marginal con-
tingency table must lie in the span of few projections of Fourier basis vectors Barak et
al. (2007):
Theorem 2. For any table h ∈ R{0,1}|I| and set of variables j ∈ {0, 1}|I|, the
marginal table on j satisfies Cj(h) =
∑
γj 〈fγ , h〉Cj(fγ).
This states that marginal j lies in the span of only those (projected) basis vectors
fγ with γ contained in j. The number of values needed to update Xi is then 2|pii|+1,
potentially far less than suggested by (1). To release updates for two r.v.’s i, j ∈ I there
may well be significant overlap 〈pii, pij〉; we need to release once, coefficients 〈fγ , h〉
for γ in the downward closure of variable neighbourhoods:
NI ,
⋃
i∈I
⋃
jpii
j .
Privacy. By (Barak et al., 2007, Theorem 6) we can apply Laplace additive noise to
release these Fourier coefficients.
Corollary 2. For any  > 0, releasing for each γ ∈ NI the Fourier coefficient
〈fγ , h〉+ Lap (2|NI |−12−|I|/2) (and Algorithm 2) preserves -differential privacy.
Remark 1. Since |NI | ≤ |I|21+maxi∈I indeg(i), at worst we have noise scale
|I|22+maxi indeg(i)−|I|/2/.
This compares favourably with Algorithm 1’s noise scale provided no r.v. is child to
more than half the graph. Moreover the denser the graph—the more overlap between
nodes’ parents and the less conditional independence assumed—the greater the reduc-
tion in scale. This is intuitively appealing.
Consistency. What is gained by passing to the Fourier domain, is that the perturbed
marginal tables of Corollary 2 are consistent: anything in the span of projected Fourier
basis vectors corresponds to some valid contingency table on I with (possibly negative)
real-valued cells Barak et al. (2007).
7
Algorithm 2 Laplace Mechanism in the Fourier Domain
1: Input data D; graph I, {pii | i ∈ I}; prior parameters α,β  0; parameters
t,  > 0
2: define contingency table h ∈ R{0,1}|I| on D
3: define downward closure NI =
⋃
i∈I
⋃
jpii j
4: for γ ∈ NI do
5: Fourier coefficient zγ = 〈fγ , h〉+ Lap
(
2|NI |
2|I|/2
)
6: end for
7: increment first coefficient z0 ← z0 + 4t|NI |
2
2|I|/2
8: for i ∈ I do
9: project marginal for Xi as hi =
∑
γpii zγC
pii(fγ)
10: for j  pii do
11: output posterior param
(
αij + h
i
ei+j
, βij + h
i
j
)
12: end for
13: end for
Non-negativity. So far we have described the first stage of Algorithm 2. The remain-
der yields stealth by guaranteeing releases that are non-negative w.h.p. We adapt an
idea of Barak et al. (2007) to increase the coefficient of Fourier basis vector f0, af-
fecting a small increment to each cell of the contingency table. While there is an exact
minimal amount that would guarantee non-negativity, it is data dependent. Thus our
efficient O (|NI |)-time approach is randomised.
Corollary 3. For t > 0, adding 4t|NI |2−12−k/2 to f0’s coefficient induces a non-
negative table w.p. ≥ 1− exp(−t).
Parameter t trades off between the probability of non-negativity and the resulting
(minor) loss to utility. In the rare event of negativity, re-running Algorithm 2 affords
another chance of stealth at the cost of privacy budget . We could alternatively truncate
to achieve validity, sacrificing stealth but not privacy.
Utility. Analogous to Proposition 1, each perturbed marginal is close to its unper-
turbed version w.h.p.
Theorem 3. For each i ∈ I and δ ∈ (0, 1), the perturbed tables in Algorithm 2 satisfy
with probability at least 1− δ:
∥∥Cpii(h)− hi∥∥
1
≤ 4|NI |

(
2|pii| log
|NI |
δ
+ t|NI |
)
.
Note that the scaling of this bound is reasonable since the table hi involves 2|pii|+1
cells.
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4 Privacy by Posterior Sampling
For general Bayesian networks,B can release samples from the posterior Dimitrakakis
et al. (2014) instead of perturbed samples of the posterior’s parametrisation. We now
develop a calculus of building up (stochastic) Lipschitz properties of systems of r.v.’s
that are locally (stochastic) Lipschitz. Given smoothness of the entire network, differ-
ential privacy and utility of posterior sampling follow.
4.1 (Stochastic) Lipschitz Smoothness of Networks
The distribution family {pθ : θ ∈ Θ} on outcome space S, equipped with pseudo
metric3 ρ, is Lipschitz continuous if
Assumption 1 (Lipschitz Continuity). Let d(·, ·) be a metric on R. There exists L > 0
such that, for any θ ∈ Θ:
d(pθ(x), pθ(y)) ≤ Lρ(x, y),∀x, y ∈ S.
We fix the distance function d to be the absolute log-ratio (cf. differential privacy).
Consider a general Bayesian network. The following lemma shows that the individual
Lipschitz continuity of the conditional likelihood at every i ∈ I implies the global
Lipschitz continuity of the network.
Lemma 2. If there exists L = (L1, · · · , L|I|) ≥ 0 such that ∀i ∈ I, ∀x,y ∈ X =∏|I|
i=1 Xi we have d(pθ(xi|xpii), pθ(yi|ypii)) ≤ Liρi(xi, yi), then d(pθ(x), pθ(y)) ≤
‖L‖∞ρ(x,y) where ρ(x,y) =
∑|I|
i=1 ρi(xi, yi).
Note that while Lipschitz continuity holds uniformly for some families e.g., the ex-
ponential distribution, this is not so for many useful distributions such as the Bernoulli.
In such cases a relaxed assumption requires that the prior be concentrated on smooth
regions.
Assumption 2 (Stochastic Lipschitz Continuity). Let the set of L-Lipschitz θ be
ΘL ,
{
θ ∈ Θ : sup
x,y∈S
{d(pθ(x), pθ(y))− Lρ(x, y)} ≤ 0
}
Then there exists constants c, L0 > 0 such that, ∀L ≥ L0: ξ(ΘL) ≥ 1− e−cL.
Lemma 3. For the conditional likelihood at each node i ∈ I, define the set Θi,L of
parameters for which Lipschitz continuity holds with Lipschitz constant L. If ∃c =
(c1, · · · , c|I|) such that ∀i, L ≥ L0, ξ(Θi,L) ≥ 1 − e−ciL, then ξ(ΘL) ≥ 1 − e−c′L,
where c′ = mini∈I ci − ln |I|/L0 when |I| ≤ eL0 mini∈I ci .
Therefore, (Dimitrakakis et al., 2015, Theorem 7) asserts differential privacy of the
Bayesian network’s posterior.
3Meaning that ρ(x, y) = 0 does not necessarily imply x = y.
9
Theorem 4. Differential privacy is satisfied using the log-ratio distance, for all B ∈
SΘ and x,y ∈ X :
1. Under the conditions in Lemma 2:
ξ(B | x) ≤ exp{2Lρ(x,y)}ξ(B | y)
i.e., the posterior ξ is (2‖L‖∞, 0)-differentially private under pseudo-metric
ρ(x,y).
2. Under the conditions in Lemma 3, if ρ(x,y) ≤ (1 − δ)c uniformly for all x,y
for some δ ∈ (0, 1):
|ξ(B | x)− ξ(B | y)| ≤
√
M
2
·max{ρ(x,y), 1}
whereM =
(
κ
c + L0(
1
1−e−ω + 1) + lnC + ln
(
e−L0δc(e−ω(1−δ) − e−ω)−1 + eL0(1−δ)c))C;
constants κ = 4.91081 and ω = 1.25643; C =
∏|I|
i Ci; and
Ci = sup
x∈X
pθ?i,MLE(xi | xpii)∫
Θi
pθi(xi | xpii)dξ(θi)
,
the ratio between the maximum and marginal likelihoods of each likelihood func-
tion. Note that M = O (( 1c + lnC + L0)C) i.e., the posterior ξ is (0,√M2 )-
differentially private under pseudo-metric
√
ρ for ρ(x,y) ≥ 1.
4.2 MAP by the Exponential Mechanism
As an application of the posterior sampler, we now turn to releasing MAP point es-
timates via the exponential mechanism McSherry and Talwar (2007), which samples
responses from a likelihood exponential in some score function. By selecting a utility
function that is maximised by a target non-private mechanism, the exponential mecha-
nism can be used to privately approximate that target with high utility. It is natural then
to select as our utility u the posterior likelihood ξ (·|D). This u is maximised by the
MAP estimate.
Algorithm 3 Mechanism for MAP Point Estimates
1: Input data D; prior ξ (·); appropriate smoothness parameters c, L,M > 0; param-
eters distance r > 0, privacy  > 0
2: calculate posterior ξ (θ|D)
3: set ∆ =
{√
Lr , if Lipschitz continuous√
0.5M , if stochastic Lipschitz
4: output θˆ sampled ∝ exp
(
ξ(θ|D)
2∆
)
ξ (θ)
Formally, Algorithm 3, under the assumptions of Theorem 4, outputs response θ
with probability proportional to exp(u(D, θ)/2∆) times a base measure µ(θ). Here
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∆ is a Lipschitz coefficient for u with sup-norm on responses and pseudo-metric ρ on
datasets as in the previous section. Providing the base measure is non-trivial in general,
but for discrete finite outcome spaces can be uniform McSherry and Talwar (2007). For
our mechanism to be broadly applicable, we can safely take µ(θ) as ξ (θ).4
Corollary 4. Algorithm 3 preserves -differential privacy wrt pseudo-metric ρ up to
distance r > 0.
Proof. The sensitivity of the posterior score function corresponds to the computed
∆ (Dimitrakakis et al., 2015, Theorem 6) under either Lipschitz assumptions. The re-
sult then follows from (McSherry and Talwar, 2007, Theorem 6).
Utility for Algorithm 3 follows from McSherry and Talwar (2007), and states that
the posterior likelihood of responses is likely to be close to that of the MAP.
Lemma 4. Let θ? = maxθ ξ (θ|D) with maximizer the MAP estimate, and let St =
{θ ∈ Θ : ξ (θ|D) > θ? − t} for t > 0. Then P(Sc2t) ≤ exp(−t)/ξ (St).
5 Experiments
Having proposed a number of mechanisms for approximating exact Bayesian inference
in the general framework of probabilistic graphical models, we now demonstrate our
approaches on two simple, well-known PGMs: the (generative) naïve Bayes classifier,
and (discriminative) linear regression. This section, with derivations in the Appendix,
illustrates how our approaches are applied, and supports our extensive theoretical re-
sults with experimental observation. We focus on the trade-off between privacy and
utility (accuracy and MSE respectively), which involves the (private) posterior via a
predictive posterior distribution in both case studies.
4In particular the base measure guarantees we have a proper density function: if u(D, θ) is bounded by
M , then we have normalising constant
∫
θ exp(u(D, θ))µ(θ)dθ ≤ exp(M) <∞.
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5.1 Bayesian Discrete Naïve Bayes
An illustrative example for our mechanisms is a Bayesian naïve Bayes model on Bernoulli
class Y and attribute variables Xi, with full conjugate Beta priors. This PGM directly
specialises the running Example 1. We synthesised data generated from a naïve Bayes
model, with 16 features and 1000 examples. Of these we trained our mechanisms on
only 50 examples, with uniform Beta priors. We formed predictive posteriors for Y |X
from which we thresholded at 0.5 to make classification predictions on the remaining,
unseen test data so as to evaluate classification accuracy. The results are reported in Fig-
ure 1, where average performance is taken over 100 repeats to account for randomness
in train/test split, and randomised mechanisms.
The small size of this data represents a challenge in our setting, since privacy is
more difficult to preserve under smaller samples Dwork et al. (2006). As expected,
privacy incurs a sacrifice to accuracy for all private mechanisms.
For both Laplace mechanisms that perturb posterior updates, note that the dBoolean
attributes and class label (being sole parent to each) yields nodes |I| = d+1 and down-
ward closure size |NI | = 2d+ 2. Following our generic mechanisms, the noise added
to sufficient statistics is independent on training set size, and is similar in scale. t was
set for the Fourier approach, so that stealth was achieved 90% of the time—those times
that contributed to the plot. Due to the small increments to cell counts for Fourier, nec-
essary to achieve its additional stealth property, we expect a small decrease to utility
which is borne out in Figure 1.
For the posterior sampler mechanism, while we can apply Assumption 2 to a Bernoulli-
Beta pair to obtain a generalised form of (, δ)-differential privacy, we wish to compare
with our -differentially-private mechanisms and so choose a route which satisfies As-
sumption 1 as detailed in the Appendix. We trim the posterior before sampling, so that
probabilities are lower-bounded. Figure 1 demonstrates that for small , the minimal
probability at which to trim is relatively large resulting in a poor approximate pos-
terior. But past a certain threshold, the posterior sampler eventually outperforms the
other private mechanisms.
5.2 Bayesian Linear Regression
We next explore a system of continuous r.v.’s in Bayesian linear regression, for which
our posterior sampler is most appropriate. We model label Y as i.i.d. Gaussian with
known-variance and mean a linear function of features, and the linear weights endowed
with multivariate Gaussian prior with zero mean and spherical covariance. To satisfy
Assumption 1 we conservatively truncate the Gaussian prior (cf. the Appendix), and
sample from the resulting truncated posterior; form a predictive posterior; then compute
mean squared error. To evaluate our approach we used the U.S. census records dataset
from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series Minnesota Population Center (2009)
with 370k records and 14 demographic features. To predict Annual Income, we train
on 10% data with the remainder for testing. Figure 2 displays MSE under varying prior
precision b (inverse of covariance) and weights with bounded norm 10/
√
b (chosen
conservatively). As expected, more concentrated prior (larger b) leads to worse MSE
for both mechanisms, as stronger priors reduce data influence. Compared with linear
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regression, private regression suffers only slightly worse MSE. At the same time the
posterior sampler enjoys increasing privacy (that is proportional to the bounded norm
as given in the Appendix).
6 Conclusions
We have presented a suite of mechanisms for differentially-private inference in graph-
ical models, in a Bayesian framework. The first two perturb posterior parameters to
achieve privacy. This can be achieved either by performing perturbations in the origi-
nal parameter domain, or in the frequency domain via a Fourier transform. Our third
mechanism relies on the choice of a prior, in combination with posterior sampling. We
complement our mechanisms for releasing the posterior, with private MAP point es-
timators. Throughout we have proved utility and privacy bounds for our mechanisms,
which in most cases depend on the graph structure of the Bayesian network: naturally,
conditional independence affects privacy. We support our new mechanisms and analy-
sis with applications to two concrete models, with experiments exploring the privacy-
utility trade-off.
Acknowledgements. This work was partially supported by the Swiss National Foun-
dation grant “Swiss Sense Synergy” CRSII2-154458.
A Proofs for Laplace Mechanism on Posterior Updates
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let us denote the event of a Laplace sample exceeding z > 0 in absolute value as Ak,
k ∈ 1, · · · , 2m. Consider the probability of an event that none of the 2m i.i.d. Laplace
noise we add to each count exceed z > 0 in absolute value:
1− P[∪2mk=1{Ak}] ≥ 1−
2m∑
k=1
P[Ai]
= 1− 2m exp(−z/2|I|)).
To make sure this probability is no smaller than 1 − δ, we need z to be at most to
2|I|
 ln(
2m
δ ).
A.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Lemma A.1. (McDiarmid’s inequality) Suppose that random variablesZ1, · · · ,Zm ∈
Z are independent, f is a mapping from Zm to R. For z1, · · · , zn, z′k ∈ Z , if f satis-
fies
|f(z1, ...,zm)− f(z1, ...,zk−1, z′k, zk+1, ..., zm)| ≤ ck
Then
Pr[f(z1, ...,zm)− Ef ≥ t] ≤ exp
( −2t2∑
k c
2
k
)
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To prove Theorem 1, we need the following statements.
Lemma A.2. For constants t ≥ 0 and a, (a+ t) ln(a+ t)− a ln a ≤ t ln(a+ t) + t.
Proof. This follows from applying the mean value theorem to the function x ln(x) on
the interval [a, a+ t].
We need to assume that αi,j and βi,j are larger than the only turning point of the Γ
function which is between 1 and 2; αi,j , βi,j ≥ 2 is sufficient.5
Lemma A.3. For Zi,j ∈ Z ,
fi,j(Zi,j) ≤ ∆αi,j ln(αi,j + ∆αi,j)
+ ∆βi,j ln(βi,j + ∆βi,j)
− Z(1)i,j ln(αi,j + ∆αi,j − 1)
− Z(2)i,j ln(βi,j + ∆βi,j − 1) .
Proof. By monotonicity of the Γ function,
ln
(
Γ(αij + ∆αij)
Γ(αij + Zij)
)
≤ ln
(
Γ(αij + ∆αij)
Γ(αij)
)
≤ ln
(
Γ(αij)
∏∆αij−1
r=0 (αij + r)
Γ(αij)
)
=
∆αij−1∑
r=0
ln(αij + r) .
5To cover more priors, we could assume that αi,j is bounded away from zero, and that Γ at this parameter
is maximum below 2 and proceed from there for the second case.
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and by inequalities ln(x− 1) ≤ ψ(x) ≤ ln(x), we have
fij(Zij) ≤
∆αij−1∑
r=0
ln(αij + r) +
∆βij−1∑
r=0
ln(βij + r)
+ (∆αij − Z(1)ij )ψ(αij + ∆αij)
+ (∆βij − Z(2)ij )ψ(βij + ∆βij)
≤ (αij + 2∆αij) ln(αij + ∆αij)
+ (βij + 2∆βij) ln(βij + ∆βij)
− αij lnαij − βij lnβij −∆αij −∆βij
− Z(1) ln(αij + ∆αij − 1)
− Z(2)ij ln(βij + ∆βij − 1)
≤ ∆αij ln(αij + ∆αij) + ∆βij ln(βij + ∆βij)
− Z(1)ij ln(αij + ∆αij − 1)
− Z(2)ij ln(βij + ∆βij − 1)
The last inequality follows from
∆αij−1∑
r=0
ln(αij + r) <
∫ ∆αij
0
ln(αij + x)dx
= (αij + ∆αij) ln(αij + ∆αij)
−αij lnαij −∆αij .
Lemma A.4. For zi,j , z′i,j ∈ Z , f satisfies
|fi,j(zi,j)− fi,j(z′i,j)|
≤ (2n+ 1)[ln(αi,j + n+ 1) + (βi,j + n+ 1)]
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Proof. ∣∣fij(zij)− fij(z′ij)∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ln
Γ
(
αij + z
′(1)
ij
)
Γ
(
αij + z
(1)
ij
) + ln Γ
(
βij + z
′(2)
ij
)
Γ
(
βij + z
(2)
ij
)
+
(
z
′(1)
ij − z(1)ij
)
ψ(αij + ∆αij)
+
(
z
′(2)
ij − z(2)ij
)
ψ(βij + ∆βij)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ln Γ(αij + n)
Γ(αij)
+ ln
Γ(βij + n)
Γ(βij)
+ n ln(αij + ∆αij) + n ln(βij + ∆βij)
≤
n∑
r=0
ln(αij + r) +
n∑
r=0
ln(βij + r)
+ n ln(αij + ∆αij) + n ln(βij + ∆βij)
≤(αij + n+ 1) ln(αij + n+ 1)− αij lnαij
+ (βij + n+ 1) ln(βij + n+ 1)− βij lnβij − 2n− 2
+ n (ln(αij + n) + ln(βij + n))
≤(2n+ 1) (ln(αij + n+ 1) + ln(βij + n+ 1))
The distribution ofZ(1)ij is given by,

P(Z(1)ij = 0) = P(Y + ∆αij ≤ 0)
P(Z(1)ij = n) = P(Y + ∆αij ≥ n)
P(Z(1)ij ≤ z) = P(Y ≤ z −∆αij) z ∈ (0, n)
Then we have
E
(
Z
(1)
ij
)
=
∫ n
0
[1− FY (z −∆αij)]dz + nP(Y + ∆αij ≥ n)
=
∫ ∆αij
0
[
1− 1
2
exp
(
z −∆αij
b
)]
dz
+
∫ n
∆αij
1
2
exp
(
∆αij − z
b
)
dz +
n
2
exp
(
∆αij − n
b
)
=∆αij +
b
2
exp
(
−∆αij
b
)
+
n− b
2
exp
(
∆αij − n
b
)
By the same argument, the expectation of Z(2)ij is given by ∆βij +
b
2 exp
(
−∆βijb
)
+
n−b
2 exp
(
∆βij−n
b
)
.
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By plugging E
(
Z
(1)
i,j
)
and E
(
Z
(2)
i,j
)
in Lemma A.3 with have
E(fij(Zij)) ≤ (αij + 2∆αij) ln(αij + ∆αij)
+ (βij + 2∆βij) ln(βij + ∆βij)
− αij lnαij − βij lnβij −∆αij −∆βij
− ln(αij + ∆αij − 1)E
(
Z
(1)
ij
)
− ln(βij + ∆βij − 1)E
(
Z
(2)
ij
)
≤ n ln[(αij + ∆αij)(βij + ∆βij)].
When n ≥ b, this can be refined as
O (n lnn)
[
1− exp
(
− n
2|I|
)]
since E(Z(1)i,j ) and E(Z
(2)
i,j ) are lower bounded by
n
2 exp(−nb ).
Therefore, by McDiarmid’s difference inequality we have
P
∑
i,j
fi,j −
∑
i,j
E(fi,j) ≥
√
−1
2
ln δ
∑
i,j
ci,j
 ≤ δ,
where ci,j is the RHS in Lemma A.4.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 3
We follow the proof of (Barak et al., 2007, Theorem 7). If X ∼ Lap (b) then by the
CDF of the Laplace P (|X| > R) = exp(−R/b) whereR > 0. By the union bound for
{Xj}j∈NI i.i.d.∼ Lap (b), we have w.h.p. none is large P (∀j ∈ NI , |Xj | ≤ b log(|NI |/δ)) ≥
1− δ for δ ∈ (0, 1). Since ‖f j‖1 = 2k/2 for each j ⊆ I it follows with probability at
least 1−δ, that ∀j ∈ NI\{∅},
∥∥zjf j − 〈f j , h〉f j∥∥1 ≤ 2|NI | log |NI |δ . For f0 the addi-
tional increment comes at an additional cost of 4t|NI |2/. Putting everything together,
we note that 2|pii|+1 Fourier coefficients represent hi including f0.
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B Posterior Sampling
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
d(pθ(x), pθ(y)) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣log
|I|∏
i=1
pθ(xi|xpii)
pθ(yi|ypii)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤
|I|∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣log pθ(xi|xpii)pθ(yi|ypii)
∣∣∣∣
=
|I|∑
i=1
d(pθ(xi|xpii), pθ(yi|ypii))
≤
|I|∑
i=1
Liρi(xi, yi)
≤ ‖L‖∞‖ρ(x,y)‖1.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Define
Θi,L =
{
θ ∈ Θ : sup
x,y∈X
{d(pθ(xi|xpii), pθ(yi|ypii))
− Lρi(xi, yi)} ≤ 0
}
.
By taking ρ(x, y) =
∑
i ρi(xi, yi), we have
|I|⋂
i=1
Θ˜i,L
=
{
θ ∈ Θ : sup
xi,yi∈Xi
{d(pθ(xi|xpii), pθ(yi|ypii))
≤ Lρi(xi, yi)},∀i ∈ I
}
⊆
θ ∈ Θ : supxi,yi∈Xi

|I|∑
i=1
d(pθ(xi|xpii), pθ(yi|ypii))
≤ L
|I|∑
i=1
ρi(xi, yi)


⊆{θ ∈ Θ : sup{d(pθ(x), pθ(y))− Lρ(x, y)} ≤ 0}
=ΘL
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Therefore, we have that the set of θ ∈ Θ satisfying the Stochastic Lipschitz conti-
nuity for conditional likelihood of every i ∈ I in the Bayesian network is a subset of
the set of θ satisfying the global Stochastic Lipschitz continuity for same L.
Note that (
⋂|I|
i=1 Θi,L)
c =
⋃|I|
i=1(Θi,L)
c and ξ((Θi,L)c) = 1 − ξ(Θi,L) ≤ e−ciL.
Then we have
ξ[(∩|I|i=1Θi,L)c] ≤
|I|∑
i=1
ξ(Θi,L)
c) ≤
|I|∑
i=1
e−ciL.
Therefore, we have
ξ(ΘL) ≥ ξ(∩|I|i=1Θi,L) ≥ 1−
|I|∑
i=1
e−ciL ≥ 1−Ne−mini ciL.
Take c′ = ln |I|min{ci}|I|i=1, we have ξ(ΘL) ≥ 1− e−c
′L.
C Bayesian Naïve Bayes
We review the derivation of the naïve Bayes predictive posterior for two cases applied
in our experiments.
C.1 Closed-Form Beta-Bernoulli
When the r.v.’s are all Bernoulli’s with Beta conjugate priors:
P(Y = y|X = x) ∝
∫
Θ
pθ (y)
d∏
i=1
pθ (xi|y) ξ (θ) dθ.
The integral decouples into the product of (where α, β refer to the y posterior)∫
Θ
pθ (y) ξ (θ) dθ
=
∫ 1
0
θα+y−1(1− θ)β+(1−y)−1
B(α, β)
dθ
=
B(α+ y, β + 1− y)
B(α, β)
×
∫ 1
0
θα+y−1(1− θ)β+(1−y)−1
B(α+ y, β + 1− y) dθ
=
B(α+ y, β + 1− y)
B(α, β)
=
Γ(α+ y)Γ(β + 1− y)
Γ(α+ β + 1)
Γ(α+ β)
Γ(α)Γ(β)
=
αyβ1−y
α+ β
.
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and terms (where α, β refer to the xi | y posterior)∫ 1
0
θα+xi−1(1− θ)β+(1−xi)−1
B(α, β)
dθ
=
αxiβ1−xi
α+ β
,
computed in the same way.
C.2 Sampling
Given an empirical CDF sampled from our posterior sampling mechanism, we can
approximate by posterior sampling:
• Repeat many times for both y = 0, y = 1:
– Sample θˆy, θˆx1,y, . . . , θˆxd,y
– Plug-in the sampled parameters and fixed r.v.’s into the product of densities
to obtain an unnormalised probability estimate
• Average the obtained estimates, for each y = 0, y = 1
• Normalise
We modify the above slightly so that we sample from a truncated posterior. This
allows us to assume a minimal probability ω assigned to any sub-event in the naïve
Bayes network, so that the joint distribution satisfies Assumption 1. Trivially in partic-
ular this yields a differential privacy level given by  = 2 log(1/ω). Given a desired
privacy budget  we can therefore select ω = exp(−/2). We then simply rejection
sample when sampling above, to obtain samples from the truncated posterior. This is
the posterior sampler algorithm used in the naïve Bayes experiments.
D Bayesian Linear Regression
Let us denote a set of observationsD = {(x1, y1), . . . , (xn, yn)}where xi = (x(1)i , . . . , x(d)i ) ∈
Rd, yi ∈ R. In the model we assume that Yi are independent given xw. Recall that a
normal linear regression model with i.i.d Gaussian noise is given as follows,
yi =
d∑
j=1
x
(j)
i w
(j) + i, i ∼ N(0, σ2).
The normal likelihood function, as a product of likelihoods for each of the individual
components of y = (y1, . . . , yn), is given by
pw(y|x,w;σ2) = 1
(2piσ2)n/2
e−
1
2σ2
(y−xw)T (y−xw).
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Given observations D, we are interested in computing the sensitivity (in terms of
data/observation) of this likelihood, that is supw,D,D′ | ln pw(D)pw(D′) |. Note that ln
pw(D)
pw(D′)
=
ln
∏
i pw(xi,yi)∏
i pw(x
′
i,y
′
i)
=
∑
i ln
pw(xi,yi)
pw(x′i,y
′
i)
.
For simplicity, assume that the precision of Y is 1. let fw(D) denote the log-
likelihood, we have
|fw(D)− fw(D′)| ≤
∑
i
|fw(xi, yi)− fw(x′i, y′i).|
Note that by mean value theorem, we have
fw(xi, yi)− fw(x′i, y′i)
= ∇fw((1− c)(x(1)i , . . . , x(d)i , yi)
+c(x
′(1)
i , . . . , x
′(d)
i , y
′
i))
·(x(1)i − x′(1)i , . . . , x(d)i − x′(d)i , yi − y′i)
Therefore by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality we have:
∆fw(xi, yi) ≤ ||∇fw||2||(∆xi,∆yi)||2
∆fw(D,D
′) ≤
n∑
i=1
∆fw(xi, yi)
≤ ||∇fw||2
n∑
i=1
||(∆xi,∆yi)||2
Note that
dfw(xi, yi)/dx
(j)
i =
1
2σ2
(x
(j)
i w
Tw − yiw(j))
dfw(xi, yi)/dyi =
1
2σ2
(yi − wTxTi )
Recall that in linear regression, it is common to assume that every tuple (xi, yi) in
the database satisfies ||xi||2 ≤ 1 and ||yi||2 ≤ 1, we have
||∇fw||2
≤ 1
2σ2
n∑
i=1
yi − wTxTi + d∑
j=1
(
x
(j)
i ||w||2 − yiw(j)
)
≤ n
2σ2
(1 + 2||w||1 + d||w||2)
≤ n
2σ2
(1 + (d+ 2)||w||1)
Hence the log-likelihood of normal regression satisfies Assumption 1 for ρ(D,D′) =∑n
i=1 ||(∆xi,∆yi)||2 under the condition that w is bounded.
21
For normal linear regression with bounded w, it is natural to choose a prior of w
with truncated normal density, that is
p(w) ∝ N(0,Λ−1)1{||w||2 ≤ 1}
(In experiments we vary the norm bound for truncation with Λ. Our argument extends
immediately.) As we show below, this truncated normal prior is still a conjugate prior
for Gaussian likelihood.
Lemma D.1. The truncated Gaussian prior and the Gaussian likelihood of linear re-
gression is a conjugate pair and the resulted posterior is a truncated Gaussian distri-
bution.
Proof. By Bayes’s rule,
p(w|D) ∝ p(D|w)p(w)
∝ N(w|µn,Σn)1{||w||2 ≤ 1}
where µn = (XTX + σ2Λ)−1XT y and Σn = σ2(XTX + σ2Λ)−1.
Therefore the posterior BAPS (Bayesian Posterior Sampling) on p(w|D) is 2L(w)-
differentially private, where L(w) = n2σ2 (1 + 2||w||1 + d||w||2).
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